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have not passed on this question either by court decision or by legisla-
tive action.
It is the conviction of this writer that the presumption should be
abolished. At the time of its creation the presumption was in keeping
with the then prevailing domestic relations; today it has no sound basis.
However, the doctrine should not be abrogated in its entirety. Even
now there still may be a few women who, either because of a marriage
vow to obey their husbands or for other reasons, would follow their
husband's orders-even to the extreme of violating the law. These
women should be entitled to prove coercion as a defense. It is therefore
suggested that a statute on the order of the English act"5 should be
passed placing the burden of proof on the wife, yet allowing her the
opportunity to prove actual coercion and be excused.
DAVID S. EVANS
Criminal Law-Sentences to Different Places of Confinement-Con-
current or Consecutive under North Carolina Law
A new statute' was enacted during the 1955 session of the North
Carolina General Assembly which provides as follows:
"When by a judgment of any court or by operation of law a
prison sentence runs concurrently with any other sentence a
prisoner shall not be required to serve any additional time in
prison solely because the concurrent sentences are for different
grades of offenses or that it is required that they be served in
different places of confinement."
This note is an attempt to analyze the effect of this statute on the law
of North Carolina. The determination of this question necessitates a
review of the North Carolina case law governing the imposition of con-
current and consecutive sentences prior to the enactment of the 1955
legislation.
The great weight of authority in this country takes the view that a
court has power derived from the common law to impose consecutive or
cumulative sentences on the conviction of separate offenses charged in
separate indictments or separate counts of the same indictment.2 North
" CRIMINAL JUsTIcE Acr, 1925, 15 & 16 GEO. 5, c. 86, § 47: "Any presumption
of law that an offence committed by a wife in the presence of her husband is com-
mitted under the coercion of the husband is hereby abolished, but on a charge
against a wife for any offence other than treason or murder it shall be a good
defence to prove that the offence was committed in the presence of, and under
the coercion of, the husband."
N. C. Gai. STAT. § 15-6.2 (1955).
15 Am. Jua., Criminal Law § 464 (1938).
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Carolina is in accord with this view ;3 but as in all other jurisdictions the
exercise of that power must conform with certain standards in order
for the court's intention to impose consecutive sentences to be effectu-
ated: (1) The last sentence must explicitly state that the latter term of
imprisonment is to commence at the expiration of the former. 4 (2) The
reference to the former sentence in the latter must be so certain and
definite that there can be no doubt as to the times at which the latter
term of imprisonment will begin and expire.5 The Supreme Court has
declared that uncertainties and ambiguities contained in sentences pur-
porting to be consecutive will not be resolved by resort to evidence
dehors the record. 6 The court has required of the trial courts a great
degree of particularity in the imposition of consecutive sentences, 7 but
the standard of certainty required is in no event higher than the nature
of the case will permit.8 The reasons underlying these requirements of
certainty and definiteness have been explained by the Supreme Court:
"The question here is not merely one of the intention of the
' State v. Duncan, 208 N. C. 316, 180 S. E. 595 (1938) where defendant was
convicted of several offenses charged in separate counts of same indictment; In Re
Black, 162 N. C. 457, 78 S. E. 273 (1913) where defendant was convicted of
several offenses charged in separate indictments and tried by the same court; In
Re Parker, 225 N. C. 369, 35 S. E. 2d 169 (1945) where defendant was convicted
of several offenses charged in separate indictments and tried in different courts.
'In Re Black, 162 N. C. 457, 78 S. E. 273 (1913) ; State v. Duncan, 208 N. C.
316, 180 S. E. 595 (1938); State v. Stonestreet, 243 N. C. 28, 89 S. E. 2d 734
(1955).
'I Re Parker, 225 N. C. 369, 35 S. E. 2d 169 (1945). Petitioner was sentenced
to seven years in the State prison for automobile theft by the Lenior County
Superior Court. After his escape and before his recapture, he was sentenced to
three years in the State prison for larceny by the Martin County Superior Court,
that sentence "to begin at the expiration of the sentence in case number C. P.
31355." Evidence aliunde showed that the letters "C. P." meant Central Prison
and that the numbers following designated the number attached to the case by the
prison for administrative purposes. The court held that this was not a sufficient
reference to the previous sentence, that the second sentence was indefinite and
ambiguous, and that the sentences must therefore run concurrently.
I Id. at 374, 35 S. E. 2d at 172: "It is true, of course, that the intention of
the court imposing the sentence should prevail where clearly expressed. . . But
we do not think this implies that such intention should be sought through evidence
dehors the record-at least such as is here made necessary ;-that it is open to
the same sort of proof as if the judge were writing a will or making a contract."
7 Id. at 372, 35 S. E. 2d at 171. The court cited certain deficiencies in the
second sentence which caused it to run concurrently with the first: "It does not
name the county or court in which trial was had and in which the judicial
record was made and is kept, or the date or term of court, or even the name of
the defendant; nor does it give any description of the offense for which the
defendant was convicted, or designate the term of the sentence imposed-by means
of which the Lenoir County sentence, the expiration of which is to determine from
the beginning of the Martin County sentence, could be identified from the judicial
records themselves and the sentence given significance." However the court in
It Re Smith, 235 N. C. 169, 69 S. E. 2d 174 (1952), declared that it did not
intend that the indicia listed in the Parker case should be all-inclusive in every
case.8 State v. Cathey, 170 N. C. 794, 87 S. E. 532 (1915). A reversal of a previous
sentence or a diminution of a previous sentence for good conduct will not cause
a subsequent sentence to begin on the expiration of the previous sentence to fail.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
judge imposing the sentence, and the method of ascertaining it;
it is also a question of the adequate expression of that intent
within acceptable standards of certainty in dealing with the lib-
erty and lives of those charged with violations of the law."0
If the intention of the court to impose consecutive sentences is not
adequately expressed in accordance with the above requirements of
certainty and definiteness, the sentences will be presumed to run con-
currently. The rule as stated in several decisions of the North Carolina
Supreme Court is as follows:
"In the absence of a statute to the contrary, and unless it
sufficiently appears otherwise in the sentence itself, it is generally
presumed that sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction, to be
served at the same place or prison, run concurrently, although
imposed at different times, and by different courts and upon
a person already serving sentence." 10
The state has the burden of showing that the sentences are consecutive;
this burden is carried when the sentence is certain and definite within
itself." The court has declared that no presumption will be indulged
in favor of sustaining a sentence as cumulative.' 2
In In Re Smith,:3 however, the court held that sentences to different
places of confinement are by their very nature cumulative and that two
sentences in order to run concurrently must be to the same place of
confinement. In that case defendant, already serving a sentence in the
State prison, was sentenced to the Jackson County jail for a term of
eighteen months to be assigned to the roads under the supervision of the
State Highway and Public Works Commission. The court stated that
the sentences could not run concurrently even if it were conceded that
the second sentence lacked the required degree of certainty and definite-
ness to impose consecutive sentences in a situation where the place of
confinement in each sentence is the same. The rule of In Re Smith was
reiterated in a recent decision of the North Carolina Court14 where the
sentences were imposed prior to the enactment of the 1955 statute above.
The court commented that the statute had apparently changed the rule
of In Re Smith as to sentences imposed after the enactment, but un-
fortunately made no further observations on the effect of the statute on
North Carolina law.
'In Re Parker, 225 N. C. 369, 373, 35 S. E. 2d 169, 172 (1945).0Id. at 372, 35 S. E. 2d at 171; In Re Smith, 235 N. C. 169, 171, 69 S. E.
2d 174, 175 (1952).
In Re Parker, 225 N. C. 369, 35 S. E. 2d 169 (1945).12 Ibid.
13235 N. C. 169, 69 S. E. 2d 174 (1952). See also Ex Parte Bentley, 240
N, C. 112, 81 S. E. 2d 206 (1912), in accord with In Re Smith.
"In Re Swink, 243 N. C. 86, 89 S. E. 2d 792 (1955).
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The provisions of the 1955 enactment present difficulties of interpre-
tation important not only to those concerned with the administration of
the law but perhaps even more so to those whose lives and liberty are
directly affected by the legislation. A comparison of the statute with
prior North Carolina case law raises these questions:
(1) To what extent is the rule of In Re Smith abrogated? If a
sentence to confinement in the State prison is imposed upon one pre-
viously sentenced to confinement in a county jail or any other place of
confinement, the statute clearly provides that the difference of places
of confinement is not enough in itself to cause the sentences to run
consecutively. This is a clear departure from prior North Carolina
law and the weight of authority in this country.15
If the writer might speculate, the intention of the legislature in
enacting the new law would seem to be a grant to the courts of the
power of discretion necessary to render justice in all cases, i.e., to im-
pose sentences in a manner most compatible with the public good and
the rehabilitation of the individual prisoner. The rule of In Re Smith
was apparently repugnant to the senses of the enactors. If this assi tmp-
tion is true, then the statute may fall short of the goal set for it. The
statute speaks only of "additional time in prison"; its language does not
provide that a prisoner shall not be required to spend additional time
in a county jail when it is the desire of the court to impose a subsequent
jail sentence to run concurrently with a previous sentence to a term in
the State prison. If the word "prison" is given a literal construction,
that it means the State prison, then it would seem that the rule of In Re
Smith is still applicable in this situation. On the other hand, if "prison"
is construed to mean any place of confinement, then the statute would
accomplish its purpose in this situation. In view of the fact that the
word "prison" has been used previously in the same statute to mean
the State prison as opposed to all other places of confinement, the latter
construction would be liberal indeed.1 6 The statute is at least an im-
portant step toward the elimination of the In Re Smith doctrine,
a stringent rule which in some cases may be a stumbling block to the
1124 C. J. S., Criminal Law § 1996 (1941). But the new North Carolina
rule imposed by the statute is not without legal precedent. See Capone v. United
States, 51 F. 2d 609 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 669 (1931), where it
,vas held that a sentence to a county jail ran concurrently with a sentence to a
federal prison. This case is an exception to the federal rule usually stated. See
United States v. Remus, 12 F. 2d 239 (6th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, Remus v.
United States, 271 U. S. 689 (1926).
"' Quaere: Should not the word "prison" as used in the phrase "any additional
time in prison" be construed as meaning any place of confinement even though
such construction would violate the rule that identical words used in the same
section of a statute should be given like meanings? All laws are to be construed
sensibly; what otherwise would be a strained construction is unobjectionable if
necessary to avoid a foolish or unjust result.
19561
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administration of justice; however whether it constitutes such a complete
rejection of the North Carolina law that a court is now vested with the
power to use its discretion as to the imposition of concurrent or consecu-
tive sentences in this situation depends upon the extent to which the
Supreme Court is willing to pursue the apparent intention of the legis-
lature.
The imposition of several sentences to terms in separate county
jails raises still another problem under the new enactment. In no sense
does the 1955 statute authorize the imposition of concurrent sentences to
confinement in separate jails; however there is some doubt as to whether
the rule of In Re Smith prohibited such concurrent sentences. The
rule was stated: "Two sentences, in order to run concurrently, must
be to the same place of confinement."' 1 "Place" would seem to indicate
geographical position rather than a type of penal institution; however
in the Smith case the sentences in question were to terms in separate
types of institutions, viz. the State prison and the Jackson County jail.
The rule as stated in some jurisdictions is that the presumption of con-
currency of sentences exists when the sentences are to imprisonment
in the same institution or same type of institution.' 8 This latter rule,
rather than a strict interpretation of the rule of the Smith case, has been
adopted in effect by the State Highway and Public Works Commission
as a matter of practice, but only where both of the sentences to separate
county jails provide that the prisoner is to work under the supervision
of that commission. It would appear likely that the Supreme Court
would interpret the rule of the Smith case to conform with this logical
administrative policy.
However, where a prisoner has been sentenced to a term in a county
jail and assigned to the jail itself or some other county institution other
than under the State Highway and Public Works Commission, a sub-
sequent sentence to a different county jail regardless of assignment has
been administratively construed to run consecutively to the first sentence
because of the In Re Smith rule. The same is true where the chrono-
logical order of such sentences is reversed. The statute is not applicable
in this situation. Unless the Smith rule is construed to mean that two
sentences in order to run concurrently must be to the same institution
or the same type of institution, two such sentences could not run con-
currently particularly in the absence of the connotation of "same place"
furnished by provisions in both sentences for assignment to the State
Highway and Public Works Commission.
(2) How is the presumption of concurrency of sentences affected by
the statute? The presumption as declared by the Supreme Court arose
'7235 N. C. 169, 172, 69 S. E. 2d 174, 176 (1952).
1824 C. J. S., Criminal Law § 1996 (1941).
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only when two sentences were imposed against the same person to the
same place of confinement.19 Now that a prison sentence may be imposed
to run concurrently with any other sentence, it would logically follow
that the presumption of concurrency should arise in this situation, not-
withstanding that the places of imprisonment are different. Stated an-
other way, cessante ratione legis cessat. It would seem that the presump-
tion should exist in every situation where one sentence may run concur-
rently with another. The statute was apparently intended to eliminate
every vestige of the old rule that a sentence to the State prison could not
run concurrently with any other sentence. 20  With that objective as a
background for the interpretation of the statute, it would seem the better
view that in the absence of a definite and certain expression of the in-
tention of the court to the contrary, one sentence shall be presumed to
run concurrently with any other unless the sentences are cumulative as
a matter of law. If the difference in places of confinement is no ground
for holding that one sentence must run consecutively to a prior sentence,
it can only be fair to the prisoner that the state must show the required
certainty and definiteness of the latter sentence in order to make the
sentences run consecutively.
The questions presented here must be dealt with when this statute
is presented to the courts for construction. If the intention of the
enactors is to grant to the courts the power of discretion to impose con-
current or consecutive sentences as they deem appropriate, that intention
may well be frustrated as a result of the restrictive wording of the
statutory provisions. The power of discretion to impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences necessary to a court in order to render justice in
all cases would be most effectively afforded by a remedial statute pro-
posed as follows:
Concurrent Sentences for Offenses of Different Grades or to be
Served in Different Places.
Where two or more sentences to confinement are imposed against
the same person, regardless of whether said sentences are to different
places of confinement or are for different grades of offenses, it shall be
presumed that the sentences are to be served concurrently unless the
contrary clearly appears; and any reasonable doubt or ambiguity must
be resolved in favor of the prisoner.
ROBERT B. MIDGETTE
"o See note 10 supra.
20 In Re Smith, 235 N. C. 169, 69 S. E. 2d 174 (1952).
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